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are, diminished considerably.28 Furthermore, the problems that do exist
seem capable of the kind of solution that will enable the fairness doc-
trine to deal fairly with the public as well as the licensee.
THOMAS T. TERP
Constitutional Law-STATE ACTION-CLOSING RATHER THAN DE-
SEGREGATING RECREATIONAL FACILITIES. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S.
Ct. 1940 (1971).
In 1963 the City of Jackson, Mississippi, reacting to a declaratory
judgment,' closed four city-owned swimming pools and surrendered
the lease on another,2 rather than operate the pools on a desegregated
basis. Black citizens of Jackson brought a class action to compel the
city to reopen the pools on an integrated basis. The court of appeals,
in a divided opinion, affirmed the district court's finding that the clos-
ing was in the interest of peace, order, safety, and economy, and that
the closing of the pools was not a denial of equal protection of the laws
to Negroes.4
reconsideration denied, 21 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 22, appeal pending, D.C. Cir., No. 71-
8181, noted in 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 452 (1971). Brandywine marks the first instance of
the Commission's willingness to deal severely with a fairness violator. In Brandywine,
the licensee was cited for failure to comply with general obligations of fairness as
well as other administrative infractions. 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 22 (1970).
28. Additionally, the licensee's obligation is merely one of good faith discretion,
and reasonable judgment. See note 10 supra. But the burden of proof of good faith
compliance with the doctrine is on the licensee. Complainants have the burden of
presenting evidence that tends to show non-compliance, but once a prima facie showing
of failure is made, the burden shifts to the licensee. See Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F-2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969), noted in 83
HARv. L. REv. 1412 (1970).
1. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd per curian, 313
F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The district court ruled that
Jackson's enforced segregation in the operation of its public parks, golf courses, swim-
ming pools, zoos, libraries, auditoriums and other recreational facilities constituted
a denial of equal protection of the laws. However, the court noted with approval the
policy of voluntary separation of the races in Jackson and declined to issue an in-
junction forbidding the discriminatory practices. 206 F. Supp. at 543.
2. This pool, in Leavell Woods Park, was subsequently operated on a "whites only"
basis by the original lessor, the Jackson Y.M.C.A. Another pool, initially sold to the
Y.M.C.A, was later bought by Jackson State College and used by members and guests
of its predominantly black student body. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940, 1943
(1971).
3. This decision is not officially reported.
4. Palmer v. Thompson, 391 F.2d 324 (5th Cir.), rehearing, 419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir.
1970).
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The Supreme Court affirmed,5 finding no continuing state involve-
ment in the segregated private operation of pools. The Court held that.
Jackson had "completely ceased running swimming pools" " and that
";no state action affected blacks differently from whites" since the pools
were closed to blacks and whites alike.7 The Court concluded that in
the absence of state action, even a "sole" or "dominant" motive to-
avoid integration is insufficient to invalidate the closing."
Since Brown v. Board of Education,9 the Supreme Court has re-
affirmed the principle that official segregation of public facilities, in-
eluding recreational facilities and services,' violates the fourteenth
amendment." Brown precipitated complying court orders' 2 as well as
evasive state responses.' 3 But attempts to evade desegregation by action
5. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. 1940 (1971).
6. Id. at 1943. See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218 (1964). In Griffin the county's efforts to close its schools to avoid integration and
its attempts to finance and operate segregated "private" schools were found to con-
stitute state actions which denied equal protection of the law.
7. 91 S. Ct. at 1945.
S8. Id.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Therein it was held that "separate educational facilities were
inherently unequal' Id. at 495.
10. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (parks and play-
grounds); New Orleans City Park Improv. Ass'n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.),
aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (city park); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d"
93 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf course); Dawson v.,
Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)'
(public beach and bathhouses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n., 202 F.2d
275 (6th Cir. 1953), rev'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (golf course, fishing lake,
and private amphitheater).
11. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV provides: "No State shall .. .deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Palmer majority, con-
ceding that "the Equal Protection Clause was principally designed to protect Negroes
against discriminatory action by the States," considered the primary question to be
whether closing the pools to all races is state action that denies equal protection to
Negroes. 91 S. Ct. at 1942.
12. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956) (beach
and swimming pool); Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 202 F. Supp. 59 (ND. Ala. 1961),
aff'd sub nom. Hanes v. Shuttlesworth, 310 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1962) (parks, tennis
courts, swimming pools, auditorium, museum and other facilities); Moorhead v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp. 131 (SD. Fla.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1957)
(golf course); Ward v. City of Miami, 151 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (golf course);
Holley v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Va. 1957) (golf course); Fayson
v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (city parks).
13. Regarding educational facilities, the Supreme Court has criticized evasive tactics
and, in lieu of the "all-deliberate-speed" guide for desegregation, ordered that segre-
gated school systems be terminated "at once:' Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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such as leasing municipally owned facilities, 1 resigning public trustee-
ships to private trustees,", and selling facilities subject to a reversionary
interest in the state,'" have been consistently struck down by the Court.
On the other hand, municipal decisions to sell facilities absolutely!-r
or to close and retain possession' 8 of recreational facilities rather than
desegregate have been upheld.
The relevance of state motivation in cases involving closing of public
facilities has become a significant but difficult problem for courts."
14. Muir v. Louisville Park and Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (segregated
operation of a municipally owned amphitheater by a private lessee held subject to the
fourteenth amendment). See also Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.
1965) (lessee of segregated state park subject to the fourteenth amendment); Dep't
of Conservation & Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
838 (1956) (lessee of segregated state park subject to the fourteenth amendment).
15. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). Therein, a public trusteeship in park lands
restricted by will to segregated use was resigned in favor of a private trustee who con-
tinued to operate the park on a segregated basis. The private trustee was required
to desegregate because the functions of operating a park were held to be governmental
in nature and thus cannot evade a state's constitutional limitations. Id. at 299.
16. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US.
911 (1962). A reversionary clause in the city's contract for sale of golf courses, sold
to avoid their desegregation, was held to constitute sufficient "state involvement" so
as to subject private buyers to the requirement of the fourteenth amendment.
17. Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 162 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. N.C.), aff'd, 276 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1958). See also, Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), wherein the Supreme Court indicated that an
"absolute" sale of public golf courses, even for the purpose of avoiding their de-
segregation, would not violate the fourteenth amendment.
18. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962) (city terminated
operation of swimming pools in reaction to a court desegregation order, held not
violative of equal protection and not grounds for contempt); City of Montgomery v.
Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960) (city closed its public parks in lieu of de-
segregating them); Clark v. Flory, 237 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1956) (state park closed);
Walker v. Shaw, 209 F. Supp. 569 (W.D. S.C. 1962) (public skating rink closed to
avoid desegregation).
19. A concomitant principle to motivation in Palmer, which is not considered in
the above discussion, is that the pool closing affected blacks and whites alike. 91 S.
Ct. at 1945. This seems but a splinter of the separate but equal interpretation in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine,
the Court in Broum I explained that equal treatment with respect to some areas, for
example, school buildings and teaching staffs, did not guarantee equal treatment with
respect to intangible, but perhaps more important areas, such as, cultural values, ad-
justment to environment, and freedom to associate. If it is unconstitutional for a state
to attempt, under the Plessy doctrine, to provide separate facilities equally, is Jackson's
attempt to withdraw facilities equally any less discriminatory? This equal effect
argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court in other contexts because it does
not recognize the reality of unequal consequences falling on minority groups. See, e.g.,
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1965) (state legislation authorizing voter approval of
[Vol. 13:151,9
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In Griffin v. County School Board,20 the Court held that whatever
nonracial grounds might support closing public schools, the justifica-
tions must be constitutional and "grounds of race and opposition to de-
segregation do not qualify as constitutional." 21 The Court earlier had
held that legislation providing a governor authority to close any school
ordered to desegregate was unconstitutional 2 More specifically in
Evans v. Ahney23 where Georgia resigned a state park to private trus-
tees in order to avoid desegregation, the majority tacitly assumed,24
and the dissent accepted as established law, that "under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause a state may not close a public facility solely to avoid its
duty to desegregate that facility." 25
Historically, motivation has not been considered to be a viable cri-
terion in deciding the constitutionality of state legislation. The tradi-
tional reasons are (1) that motivation is difficult to ascertain, (2) that
unconstitutional motives on the part of some legislators should not be
imputed to all legislators, and (3) that the standard of racial content
or effect is more objective and therefore more suitable.26 However,
since the litigation over civil rights has increased, the courts have been
more willing to consider motivation, especially where the intent behind
conduct rather than the intent behind legislation can be scrutinized.2r
The Court in Griffin emphasized that the sole purpose in closing the
schools was to ensure that black and white children would attend
any racial housing ordinance); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation
statute); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (designation of race on ballots).
20. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
. 21.4Id. at 231. See also, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (redistricting
to exclude Negro voters).
22. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
23. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). See also cases cited note 12 supra; Note, Constitutional Law
-You Can't Take the City Out of the Park, But You Can Take the Park Out of the
City, 49 N.C.L. REv. 148 (1970).
24. 396 U.S. at 445.
25. Id. at 453 (dissenting opinion).
26. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Justice Marshall refused to
invalidate a state bill on the basis of corrupt legislative motivation); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (statute prohibiting draftcard burning not invalid
on the ground that its possible motivation was the stifling of dissent).
27. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1209 (1970). Evidence of unconstitutional motivation could either con-
trol the decision, or shift the burden of proof. Analysis under the second approach
leads to this sequence: (1) closing after an order of integration, without rebuttal
evidence, can be presumed to be motivated by a desire to continue segregation; and
-(2) such prima facia motivation would therefore necessitate the presentation of a
rational, nonracial defense.
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separate facilities. 28 The Supreme Court later supported the California-
Supreme Court's consideration of intent behind an amendment in which
the "immediate objective" was to protect a private seller's right to
discriminate.29 More recently, the Court held that an otherwise valid
refusal to sell real estate is banned by 42 U.S.C. § 1982, (dealing with
racial discrimination in housing) if that refusal is racially motivated."
Official conduct also may be unconstitutional under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(concerning racial discrimination under color of state custom or
usage), if it is motivated by invidious discrimination. These are but a
few examples of civil conduct that the Court has found actionable
"only upon proof of forbidden racial motive or animus." 31
The Court in Palmer was faced with the effects of a closing which
was motivated either by the city's alleged justifications, or a desire to
evade desegregation, or some combination of the two.3 2 The majority
disposed of the arguments that the effect of closing the pools encour-
aged discrimination 3 and established incidents of slavery.34 The Court
held that the consequences of the closing affected citizens of both races
equally.3 5
At this point, the Court could have established a clear position on the
weight of motivation either by ruling that a municipality cannot close
a facility for the predominant reason of avoiding a court expressed duty
to desegregate 0 or by ruling that such motivation places on the city
28. 377 U.S. at 231.
29. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
30. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31. Palmer v. Thompson, 91 S. Ct. at 1953 (dissenting opinion).
32. The issue in Palmer was unique in that the facts evidenced no state involvement
in the operation of desegregated facilities. Except for indirect involvement by en-
couraging or endorsing segregation, the Court was left with an opportunity to consider
motivation isolated from the variables which previously had accompanied similar
state action. Thus, it was held that "the Court's past cases do not precisely control
this one, and the present case, if reversed, would [take] the Court farther than any
before." Id. at 1947 (concurring opinion).
33. Id. at 1944 (majority opinion). In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1964), the
Court found state authorization of private discrimination to be unconstitutional. The
Palmer Court found no evidence to support a similar conclusion.
34. 91 S. Cr. 1940. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the thirteenth
amendment was interpreted to outlaw incidents of slavery. The Palmer majority felt
that the thirteenth amendment would, without congressional legislation, be severely
extended by holding that a denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools with
Caucasians is an impermissible "badge or incident" of slavery. 91 S. Ct. at 1946.
35. 91 S. Ct. at 1945. See note 19 supra.
36. The Gomnillion, Bush, Griffin, Hunter series of cases evinces a strong implication
that public evasion of integration, without overriding constitutional justification, is
a violation of equal protection guarantees. The Court could logically have furthered
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the burden of showing a nonracial justification which the courts will
test against constitutional standards.3 7 Instead, the Court supported its
finding of no discriminatory effects by impliedly accepting the relatively
weak justifications that the pools could not be operated safely and
economically on an integrated basis."' Thus, the Palmer majority de-
clined to extend the rationale of previous civil rights decisions. The
Court distinguished Griffin on the grounds that Jackson was not
"involved" in any resultant private discrimination; that recreational
facilities, unlike schools, were not "essential" public services; and that
although the Griffin closing was clearly motivated by opposition to
integration, the Palmer closing considered the impact of public safety
and economy.39
this progression by expressly recognizing the relevance of motivation. An order to
reopen the pools on an integrated basis, while precedented, would not establish an
affirmative duty to provide pools, but "would merely mean that once a public service
has been offered . . .it cannot be operated or terminated when the intent or effect
is to discriminate against and to punish a particular group for the exercise of a con-
stitutional right." (Emphasis supplied). McKnight, Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-
Closing Municipal Swinmzing Pools in Response to Desegregation Order Does Not
Violate Negro Plaintiffs' Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment Rights, 16 WAYNE
'L. REv. 1434, 1445 (1970).
37. The burden of persuasion is discussed at note 27 supra. Determining motiva-
don which is contrary to constitutional standards is no more difficult or inherently
subjective than other analysis accepted by the Court. The following objective or
verifiable considerations could be used as a test for discriminatory motives: "(1) the
presence or absence of a desegregation order or a similar declaratory judgment; (2)
the effect reasonably predictable from a closing in light of community practices; (3)
the racial status of the facility at the time of closing; and (4) the bona fides of the
city's offered justifications." Comment, Closing Public Pools to Avoid Desegregation:
Treading Water, 58 GEo. L.J. 1220, 1226 (1970).
38. If violence endangers community safety or if operations prove economically bur-
densome due to integration, after integration has been attempted, there may be a com-
pelling state interest which would justify a closing of the facilities. However, these
same considerations cannot be so compelling before integration is attempted. In ruling,
for example, that an inability to operate desegregated facilities profitably would no
justify delaying desegregation, the Supreme Court has stated that "vindication of
conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is
less expensive to deny than to afford them." Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526, 537 (1963). Considering the public safety argument the Court has also stated
that "constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion or exercise:' Id. at 533. See also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (Negro
children cannot be denied constitutional rights simply to preserve law and order);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (unconstitutional ordinances and laws not
justified bv their resultant preservation of public peace). Thus, the Palmer Court could
have rejected the alleged justifications of economy and safety. Yet the majority strongly
implies that even absent any justification for the closing, unsound motivation would
still rot support a holding that the closing was unconstitutional. 91 S. Ct. at 1946.
39. 91 S. Ct. at 1943-45.
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The decision represents a return to the early position that motivation
is perhaps too difficult to ascertain. The emphasis in Griffin and Go-
million v. Lightfoot was interpreted to focus on effect rather than on
motivation. Therefore, the Court held that unless pools supplied to one
group are denied to another group, the fact that closing is justified
upon unsound hypothesis is not a sufficient ground to order pools re-
opened on an integrated basis. 40 The Palmer decision retreats from the
clear implication of a growing relevance of motivation in equal pro-
tection litigation. The issue considered has potentially significant rami-
fications. 41 The decision may be interpreted to permit a locality to
"avoid by cynical default its constitutional duty to provide desegre-
gated facilities" or to practice such tactics of delay and evasion as to
render meaningless the right to desegregated use of municipal recre-
ational facilities.42
THOMAS W. WRIGHT
Securities Regulation-INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940. Moses
v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff Moses commenced a derivative action against Fidelity Fund,
Inc., two of its affiliated directors and its investment adviser., Plaintiff
complained that the affiliated directors had failed to act upon relevant
information concerning possible methods by which a portion of the
fund-paid portfolio commissions could be recaptured to reduce fund
expenses rather than to stimulate fund sales. In addition, plaintiff
alleged that affiliated directors had consistently withheld this informa-
40. Id. at 1945-46.
41. Id. at 1947 (concurring opinion).
42. Comment, supra note 37, at 1237.
1. A brief overview of the internal operations of mutual funds is outlined in Jaretzki,
Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
777, 780 (1964).
2. Prior to December 5, 1968 when "customer directed give-ups" were abolished on
all stock exchanges, the decision as to alternative uses of brokerage commissions on
portfolio transactions was seen as one of the major problems in the mutual fund in-
dustry. See WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MtrrUAL FUNDs
3, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Note, The Use of Brokerage Com-
missions to Promote Mutual Fund Sales: Time to Give Up the "Give-Up," 68 Colum.
L. Rev. 334 (1968).
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